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Abstract
How does the preferred entry mode of foreign investors depend upon
their technological capability relative to that of their rivals? This paper de-
velops a simple model of entry mode choice and evaluates its main testable
implication using data on foreign investors in Eastern European countries
and the successor states of the Soviet Union. The model considers compe-
tition between two asymmetric foreign investors and captures the following
trade-oﬀ: while a joint venture (JV) helps a foreign investor secure a bet-
ter position in the product market vis-a-vis its rival, it also requires that
proﬁts be shared with the local partner. The model predicts that the eﬃ-
cient foreign investor is less likely to choose a JV and more likely to enter
directly relative to the ineﬃcient investor. Our empirical analysis supports
this prediction: foreign investors with more sophisticated technologies and
marketing skills (relative to other ﬁrms in their industry) tend to prefer di-
rect entry to joint ventures. This empirical ﬁnding is robust to controlling
for host country speciﬁce ﬀects and other commonly cited determinants of
entry mode.
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This study examines how the technological capability of a foreign investor relative
to its competitors aﬀects its choice between entering a host country through a
fully-owned subsidiary or via a joint venture (JV) with a local partner. A simple
theoretical model of competition between two asymmetric foreign investors is
developed and its main testable implications are evaluated using data on foreign
investment in Eastern European countries and the successor states of the Soviet
Union.
The model captures the following trade-oﬀ: while a JV helps a foreign investor
secure a better position in the product market vis-a-vis its rival, it also requires
that proﬁts be shared with the local partner. The main prediction of the model
is that the eﬃcient foreign investor is less likely to choose a JV and more likely
to enter directly relative to the ineﬃcient investor. Our empirical analysis sup-
ports this prediction: foreign investors with more sophisticated technologies and
marketing skills (relative to other ﬁrms in their industry) tend to prefer direct
entry to joint ventures. This empirical ﬁnding is robust to controlling for host
country speciﬁce ﬀects and other commonly cited determinants of entry mode.
22I n t r o d u c t i o n
During the last several decades, there has been a signiﬁcant change in the atti-
tudes of many countries towards inﬂows of foreign direct investment (FDI). From
being viewed as evil exploiters, foreign investors are now welcomed as a source
of new technologies, know-how, better management and marketing techniques.
One only needs to consider the large scale economic liberalization that has been
undertaken by Eastern European transition economies and the successor states
of the Soviet Union to appreciate the reversal in attitudes toward FDI that has
occurred in the world. As a result, there has been renewed interest among policy-
makers and academic researchers regarding the relationship between technology
transfer and FDI.1
An interesting ﬁnding in the existing empirical literature on international
technology transfer is that the technologies of joint ventures (JVs) tend to be of
an older vintage relative to those employed by wholly owned subsidiaries of multi-
national ﬁrms (Mansﬁeld and Romeo, 1980). A reasonable explanation for this
ﬁnding is that ﬁrms are reluctant to share state of the art technologies with local
partners in foreign countries due to the fear of potential competition.2 However,
this explanation ignores the fact that ﬁrms have strong incentives to utilize their
best technologies to compete more eﬀectively with their rivals. In other words, to
fully understand the relationship between mode choice and technology transfer,
one needs to account for competitive pressures among investors. In this paper, we
ask: do foreign ﬁrms that possess relatively more sophisticated technologies than
their rivals prefer direct entry to joint ventures? We develop a simple duopoly
model of mode choice that investigates this question and then evaluate its main
ﬁnding empirically by using data from a survey of foreign investors in Eastern
European transition economies and the former Soviet Republics conducted by
1There are several reasons for this interest. For instance, the consequences of restrictions
on foreign ownership that are widely prevalent in many developing countries (UNCTC, 1987)
are likely to depend upon whether mode choice is systematically related to technology transfer.
Similarly, the degree of intraindustry spillovers from FDI may also vary with the mode of
investment (see Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2002).
2See Ramachandran (1993) for a model in which the eﬀort expended by the local agent
determines the extent of technology transfer.
3the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
A casual examination of our sample suggests that there might indeed be a
systematic relationship between a ﬁrm’s relative technological sophistication and
its preferred mode of entry. We measure a ﬁrm’s technological sophistication by
the ratio of its R&D intensity (R&D expenditures as a percentage of total sales)
to the average R&D intensity of major ﬁrms operating in the same industry in in-
dustrialized countries. Figure 1 presents the average technological sophistication
index of foreign investors entering directly and via JVs in the top ﬁve investment
destinations in our sample broken down by industry. As is clear, JVs are asso-
ciated with lower values of the index in all of these ﬁve countries except Russia.
For example, in the case of the Czech Republic and Hungary, JVs are associated
with lower values of the index in eight out of nine industries.
Similarly, as Figure 2 indicates, a cross country comparison of the average
technological sophistication of investors operating JVs and subsidiaries for several
broadly deﬁned industries reveals a similar pattern: in food, machinery, electron-
ics and automobile industries, investors with higher technological sophistication
seem to prefer direct entry to JVs.
In addition to these pointers from our sample, two prominent stylized facts
of international business inform our simple model. First, it is well known that
foreign investors often choose JVs to pair up with local partners that possess com-
plementary skills and assets. For example, in a recent survey of JVs in developing
countries, more than sixty-ﬁve percent of the foreign respondents rated knowl-
edge of local politics, government regulations, local customs, and local markets
as important considerations for seeking local partners (see Miller et. al., 1996).
While local partners in JVs often bring much needed skills to a project, they also
require compensation for their services through some sort of proﬁt sharing. The
second stylized fact motivating the model is that multinationals operate mostly
in oligopolistic markets and are quite responsive to each other’s decisions (see
Caves, 1996). Thus, it is important to capture the strategic decision-making
involved in the choice of entry mode.
In the model, the two investing ﬁrms are technologically asymmetric and two
4independent parameters quantify the rent sharing aspect and the complementar-
ity of JV partners. The main result is that since ﬁrms are asymmetric, they tend
to favor diﬀerent modes of entry: the more technologically advanced a foreign
investor, the more likely it is to choose direct entry over a JV. In fact, in equilib-
rium it is never the case that the technologically advanced ﬁrm forms a JV and
its rival ﬁr mc h o o s e sd i r e c te n t r y . 3 Our model adds value to the theoretical liter-
ature on mode choice by considering competition between asymmetric investors.
By contrast, most existing models typically consider the case of a single investor
and when they do consider multiple investors they either do not allow for JVs or
assume all investors to be symmetric (see Ethier and Markusen, 1996, Horstmann
and Markusen, 1992, Markusen, 2001, Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001).
To evaluate the empirical validity of our main result, we estimate a probit
model with the dependent variable taking on the value of one if investor i en-
gages in a JV with a local partner in country k, and zero if it chooses direct entry.
The results lend support to our theoretical model by indicating that ﬁrms pos-
sessing more sophisticated technologies (relative to other ﬁrms operating in their
industry in developed countries) are less likely to engage in JVs and more likely
to enter the market directly. The same is true of ﬁrms with above average mar-
keting sophistication. Coeﬃcients on both variables (relative technological and
marketing sophistication) are statistically signiﬁc a n ta n dr e m a i ns oe v e nw h e n
entered into the same equation. Furthermore, these results are robust to the in-
clusion of host country and industry dummies. However, when both host country
and industry dummies are included in the same equation, only the technological
sophistication index remains signiﬁcant.
As a further robustness check, not employed in the earlier studies of mode
choice, we estimate a two-stage model that captures two choices: (i) the decision
to undertake FDI in a given country and (ii) the choice between direct entry and
a JV. In other words, we control for selection bias that may be present when only
3One has to be careful here: the model does not say that the eﬃcient ﬁrm never chooses a
JV but rather that, if the ineﬃcient ﬁrm does not choose a JV, the eﬃcient ﬁrm will never do
so either. There certainly exist parameter values for which both ﬁrms opt for a JV.
5actual investment projects are considered and observations pertaining to ﬁrm-
country pairs with no investment are discarded. It turns out that our results are
robust to controlling for the investment decision: it is still the case that ﬁrms with
more sophisticated technologies and marketing techniques are averse to sharing
ownership and prefer direct entry. Finally, we note that our results are robust
to controlling for country characteristics such as the evolution of the transition
process and the distance between the source and host country.
While existing empirical studies of entry mode ﬁnd a negative relationship
between the importance of ﬁrm or industry level intangible assets and the proba-
bility of entering through a JV (see Stopford and Wells, 1972; Gatignon and An-
derson, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989 and 1990; Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001), this
paper focuses on technological and marketing sophistication of investing ﬁrms
relative to other ﬁrms operating in the industry worldwide.4 Thus, we concen-
trate on intraindustry diﬀerences as a determinant of mode choice in addition
to controlling for interindustry eﬀects. Moreover, we employ a data set that is
unique in the extent of its coverage. Previous studies on the choice of entry mode
use data on FDI originating in one source country (i.e., Sweden in the case of
Blomström and Zejan, 1991 or the United States as in the case of Asiedu and Es-
fahani, 2001) or FDI entering a single host country (typically the United States as
in Kogut and Singh, 1988). Our data set covers investment projects undertaken
in multiple economies by investors from all over the world.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section presents our theoretical
model of entry mode choice. Section 3 discusses our empirical strategy, the data
used and the results obtained. The last section concludes. Details of theoretical
derivations and the data used are collected in separate appendices.
3M o d e l
In this section we develop a partial-equilibrium duopoly model of mode choice.
Two foreign ﬁrms are considering entry into a market where the inverse demand
4Some studies, however, did not ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant results (e.g., Blomström and
Zejan, 1991).
6function is given by p(q) and q denotes total output. Each ﬁrm can enter the
m a r k e td i r e c t l ya n dp r o d u c et h eg o o do ni t so w no rf o r maJ Vw i t hal o c a l
partner who lacks the ability to produce the good alone. Let e denote direct
entry and j a JV. The technology of production and distribution depends upon
mode choice in the following way. If ﬁrm i decides to enter the market directly
(i.e. by establishing a wholly owned subsidiary), it requires αi units of labor for
producing each unit and βi units for distributing it. Thus, under direct entry ﬁrm
i’s marginal cost equals
c
e
i = αi + βi (1)
By deﬁnition, under a JV, ﬁrm i must share some rents with its local partner.
Let ﬁrm i’s share of the total proﬁto ft h eJ Vb eg i v e nb yθ,w h e r eθ ∈ [0,1].5
The advantage of forming a JV is that the local partner brings knowledge and
e x p e r t i s ea b o u tt h eh o s tc o u n t r ym a r k e tw h i c hl o w e r st h eu n i tl a b o rr e q u i r e m e n t
in distribution to δβi,w h e r eδ ∈ [0,1].6 The smaller is δ, the lower a JV’s unit
cost of distribution. Thus, under a JV, ﬁrm i’s unit cost is given by
c
j
i = αi + δβi (2)
In order to generate technological asymmetry between foreign investors assume
that α1 ≤ α2 and β1 ≤ β2. Note that, holding constant the mode of entry, ﬁrm
1 has a lower marginal cost than ﬁrm 2.
Now consider the following market entry game. In the ﬁrst stage, each ﬁrm
chooses between the two modes of entry (JV versus direct entry). Next, both ﬁrms
compete in quantities (Cournot-Nash competition). Firm i’s proﬁtf u n c t i o na t
the output stage is given by πi(qi,q −i)=( p(q) − ci)qi and the associated ﬁrst
order condition for proﬁt maximization can be written as:
∂πi(qi,q −i)
∂qi
= p + p
 qi − ci =0 (3)
5Since in our data set we we do not have information regarding the equity structure of JVs,
we leave θ as an exogenous parameter.
6Note that δ is intended to represent more generally the contribution of the local partner
to the joint venture. Such contribution may take the form not only of access to distribution
networks but also knowledge of local tastes, suppliers and legislation as well as an improved
ability to navigate through the bureaucratic maze in the host country.
7Solving the above ﬁrst order conditions yields the equilibrium in the product
market. Let the pair (x,y) denote the regime where ﬁrm 1 chooses entry mode x
and ﬁrm 2 chooses entry mode y,w h e r ex,y = e,j.F u r t h e r ,l e tπ
ey
1 denote ﬁrm
1’s equilibrium proﬁtu n d e rr e g i m e(e,y) and θπ
jy
1 under regime (j,y). Similarly,












2 : under the same entry mode, ﬁrm 1 has higher total proﬁtt h a n
ﬁrm 2. Of course, it need not be the case that ﬁrm 1 has higher proﬁtw h e ni t
chooses direct entry and when ﬁr m2c h o o s e saJ V .T h i sr a n k i n gd e p e n d su p o n
the parameters of the model.
To describe the sub-game perfect equilibrium of this model, we need two
deﬁnitions. Denote the change in ﬁrm i’s proﬁtt h a tr e s u l t sf r o mi ts w i t c h i n g










Each ﬁrm can gain market share at the expense of its rival by forming a JV and
lowering its marginal cost. Of course, to do so a ﬁr mm u s tf o r s a k es o m eo ft h e
total proﬁt of the JV to the local partner. Only when the beneﬁto ff o r m i n ga
JV is higher than the cost is ui > 0. We will say that ﬁrm i has a unilateral
incentive for a JV iﬀ ui > 0.
Let ∆i denote the change in ﬁrm i’s proﬁtt h a tr e s u l t sf r o mi ts w i t c h i n gf r o m










A ﬁrm has a motive for forming a JV in response to a JV by its rival because it
too can lower its cost and regain some of its lost market share. The function ∆i
measures the strength of this motive. We will say that ﬁrm i has a competitive
incentive for a JV iﬀ ∆i > 0. Using the two sets of incentives functions, the
sub-game perfect equilibrium of the model can be described in a succinct way:
Proposition 1: The equilibrium mode choice of the two ﬁr m si sa sf o l l o w s :
(i) Both ﬁrms choose direct entry (e,e) iﬀ ui ≤ 0; (ii) ﬁrm 1 chooses direct entry
8while ﬁr m2aJ V(e,j) iﬀ ∆1 ≤ 0 and u2 > 0; (iii) both ﬁrms choose a JV
(j,j) iﬀ ∆i ≥ 0;a n d( i v )ﬁrm 1 chooses a JV and ﬁrm 2 direct entry (j,e) iﬀ
u1 > 0 and ∆2 < 0.
Our main interest is in relating a ﬁrm’s preferred mode of entry to its techno-
logical capability relative to its rival. To this end, we examine how the likelihood
of a particular regime being an equilibrium changes with a change in the under-
lying technology of the two ﬁrms. The ‘likelihood’ of a regime is measured by the
area of the parameter space over which that regime emerges as an equilibrium.
For example, if we say that a change in some underlying parameter makes it more
likely that a ﬁrm has a unilateral incentive for a JV, we mean that the parameter
space over which the function ui is positive increases.
To facilitate analytical derivations and comparisons of the incentives func-
tions, assume that the demand function is linear: p = a − bq.
Proposition 2: An increase in a ﬁrm’s marginal cost (caused either due to an
increase in αi or βi) makes it more likely that a ﬁrm has a unilateral as well as a
competitive incentive for a JV. Similarly, an increase in the marginal cost of its
rival makes it less likely that the ﬁrm has a unilateral or a competitive incentive
for a JV.7
A corollary to the above result can also be stated:
Corollary 1: Whenever ﬁrm 1 has unilateral incentive for a JV, so does ﬁrm
2. Furthermore, the regime (j, e) where ﬁrm 1 chooses a JV and ﬁrm 2 direct
entry does not constitute an equilibrium.
The rough intuition behind the above result is that whenever ﬁrm 1 prefers a
JV to direct entry, ﬁrm 2 does as well. Thus, we cannot have an equilibrium in
which only the eﬃcient ﬁrm forms a JV. Figure 3 illustrates a typical equilibrium
pattern in (δ,θ)s p a c e . 8 In this ﬁg u r e ,w ep l o tt h ez e r oc o n t o u r sf o rt h ei n c e n t i v e
functions u2 and ∆1. The other incentive functions are omitted from this ﬁgure
since they are not needed to describe the equilibrium mode choice. For example,
7For proofs of proposition 2 and corollary 1, see the appendix.
8The parameters used for this ﬁgure are: a =1 0 , α1 =1 , β1 =1 , α2 =2 ,and β2 =2 .5.
There is nothing special about these parameter values except that they give a clean ﬁgure. The
propositions and corollaries stated in the paper hold for all permissible parameter values.
9the function u1 is not plotted since it lies below all the other three functions and
does not play a critical role in determining the equilibrium mode choices of ﬁrms.
Furthermore, the fact that u1 lies below ∆2 implies that if the eﬃcient ﬁrm has
a unilateral incentive for a JV, the ineﬃcient ﬁrm has a competitive incentive to
do the same thereby ruling out (j, e) as an equilibrium entry regime.
Two properties of Figure 3 are worth noting. First, the zero contours for
all incentive functions are upward sloping. This common property of all zero
contours follows from the model’s fundamental trade-oﬀ: as the local partner’s
contribution becomes less valuable (i.e. as δ increases) each ﬁrm requires a higher
share θ of the JV’s total proﬁti fi ti st or e m a i ni n d i ﬀerent between a JV and direct
entry. Second, higher proﬁt contours lie in the South-East region: an increase in
θ and a decrease in δ make a JV more attractive relative to direct entry.9
Figure 3 can be divided into three regions. Above the zero contour for the
u2 function, (e, e) is the equilibrium. In this region, δ is large and θ is small so
that the local ﬁrm receives a large share of the total proﬁt of the JV even though
it does not make a valuable contribution to the JV. As a result, in this region,
direct entry is the dominant mode of entry for both ﬁrms. In the region between
the zero contours for the u1 and ∆2 functions, (e, j) is the equilibrium: here,
the contribution of the local partner is not large enough for ﬁr m1t oo p tf o ra
JV whereas it is suﬃcient to induce ﬁr m2t oc h o o s eaJ V .F i n a l l y ,i nt h er e g i o n
below the zero contour for the ∆2 function, (j, j) is the equilibrium: here the
local ﬁrm’s expertise really counts and the proﬁts h a r eo fﬁr m si sl a r g e .
The model presented above shows how the incentives of ﬁr m st oc h o o s eJ V s
over direct entry vary with their technological capabilities. In a broad sense, the
main empirical prediction of the model is that the more technologically sophisti-
cated a ﬁrm is relative to its rivals, the less likely it is to enter the market via a
JV. We now turn to an econometric veriﬁcation of this prediction.
9As should be clear, the model has many exogenous parameters and ﬁgures corresponding
to ﬁgure 3 can be drawn in the space of other parameters as well. Figure 3 has been drawn in
the (δ,θ) space because both of these parameters lie between 0 and 1 thereby allowing a clean
representation of equilibrium.
104 Empirical Evidence
In this section we test the main prediction of the theoretical model. The empirical
work is described in three steps. We ﬁrst present some summary statistics; then
discuss our econometric speciﬁcation and report our regression results.
4.1 Summary Statistics
As noted earlier, the data set used in this study is based on the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) survey of foreign investors supple-
mented with the information obtained from the Worldscope database. In January
1995, a brief questionnaire was sent out to all companies (about 9,500) listed in
Worldscope. Responses were obtained from 1,405 ﬁrms which reported whether
they had undertaken investments in Eastern European transition economies and
the successor states of the Soviet Union (total of twenty-one countries). Further
details about the survey and the data are given in appendix II.
Table 1 presents the breakdown of entry modes chosen by foreign investors
i no u rs a m p l ef o re a c ho ft h eh o s tc o u n t r i e s . N o t et h a tJ V so u t n u m b e rd i r e c t
entries in most host countries and constitute ﬁfty-nine percent of all projects.
Table 2 presents the percentage of foreign investors who chose a given entry
mode in each industry in our sample. The ﬁgures indicate that JVs were the
dominant form of investment in a majority of industries. However, it is striking
that in the drugs, cosmetics and health-care products sector only twelve percent
of all projects were JVs, while direct entries accounted for eighty-eight percent
of investments. Similarly, wholly owned projects constituted eighty-four percent
of all investments in the beverage sector. It is worth noting that drugs, cosmet-
ics and health-care products sector are the most R&D-intensive industry in our
sample, while the beverage sector relies heavily on advertising and investments
in marketing.
Table 3 compares the average R&D intensity of investors engaged in direct
entry with that of investors sharing ownership in each three digit SIC sector. The
sectors are grouped into high, medium and low technology category, following the
classiﬁcation used by Blomström, Lipsey and Ohlsson (1991).
11As Table 3 indicates, in all but one high technology industry, investors un-
dertaking direct entry are on average more R&D intensive than those sharing
ownership. For instance, in the drugs sector, the average value of R&D spending
is equal to 15.7 percent of sales in the case of direct entry and 10.6 percent in the
case of JVs. For the communications equipment, the corresponding ﬁgures are
13.3 and 5.6 percent. And in the case of electronic components and accessories
5.6 and 3.4. In medium technology industries, which include industrial chemicals,
motor vehicles, household appliances, etc., in half of the sectors in which both
modes are present, investors entering a host country directly are characterized by
higher level of R&D eﬀorts. The average R&D outlays are equal to 3.8 percent of
sales for direct entry and 3.2 for JVs. In low technology sectors, this is true in ten
out of sixteen cases. In each of the three groupings, the average R&D intensity
of ﬁrms entering directly is higher than that of ﬁrms engaged in JVs.
4.2 Econometric speciﬁcation








ik is unobserved and it determines the attractiveness of a JV relative
to direct entry to ﬁrm i while investing into country k. We further posit that
JV
∗
ik = WiΘ + βti + δk + εik
where ti is an index of technological sophistication of ﬁrm i, Wi is the vector of
other ﬁrm-speciﬁc determinants of the mode choice and δk captures country ﬁxed
eﬀects. The above equation is estimated using a probit model with the dependent
variable taking on the value of one if the project undertaken by ﬁrm i in country
k is a JV and zero if it is direct entry. Our model predicts that β < 0.
The choice of explanatory variables employed in the estimation is driven by
the predictions of our model as well as by the earlier empirical literature. All
variables, with the exception of regional experience which comes from the survey,
are taken from Worldscope and are for 1993 (or the closest year for which the
12information is available). Further details about each of the variables is given in
the data appendix.
Technological Sophistication: To capture the sophistication of an in-
vestor’s technology we use the ratio of its R&D intensity relative to the average
value in its industry.
One caveat of using relative R&D expenditure as a proxy for technological so-
phistication is that R&D intensity is not a perfect measure of a ﬁrm’s success in
innovative activities. Furthermore, in low technology sectors diﬀerences between
(small in general) R&D activities may not have strong eﬀects. Sophistication in
terms of marketing skills and ownership of brand-names may be far more impor-
tant in some industries. To allow for this possibility and to explicitly account for
the model’s predictions regarding marketing/distribution costs, we also control
for the investor’s advertising intensity relative to the industry average.
To capture how important these intangible assets are for a particular industry,
we include the average values of R&D- and advertising-intensity at the industry
level. This allows us to take into account both intra and interindustry eﬀects.10
Firm Size: Stopford and Wells (1972) observe that smaller multinationals,
which are likely to possess fewer intangible assets, tend to take lower equity
positions in their foreign subsidiaries. Moreover, Blomström and Zejan (1991)
suggest that smaller ﬁrms are less willing to take higher risks and are, therefore,
more likely to enter a host country through a JV. Thus, we control for ﬁrm size
and expect to ﬁnd that it is negatively correlated with the probability of a JV.
Production Diversiﬁcation: As Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) note, although
a multinational may be well endowed in intangible assets, their role in its invest-
ment projects may be limited if these assets are spread over a wide range of
industries. Following their suggestion, we control for production diversiﬁcation
and expect to ﬁnd a positive sign on its coeﬃcient implying that diversiﬁcation
is positively correlated with the probability of a JV.
10Note that the earlier literature usually employed either ﬁrm or industry level proxies for
intangible assets. Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) included a ﬁrm speciﬁc measure of all intangible
assets (proxied by the ratio of sales to tangible assets) as well as industry level R&D intensity.
None of the earlier studies controlled for intraindustry eﬀects explicitly.
13Regional Experience: Our model assumes that a JV partner contributes
skills complementary to those of a foreign investor. The more familiar a foreign
investor with the region, the lesser its need for a local partner. On the other
hand, greater familiarity with a particular region may lower the cost of ﬁnding a
suitable JV partner. Thus, the impact of regional experience on the propensity
to seek a JV is unclear. To control for regional experience we include a dummy
variable taking on the value of one if a ﬁrm had a trading relationship with the
region before 1990 and zero otherwise.
International Experience: As Anderson and Gatignon (1988) and Blom-
ström and Zejan (1991) show, ﬁrms with greater experience in foreign operations
in general may be more adept in monitoring and dealing with local employees
and thus may be less likely to share ownership. Since what matters is not just
the country or region speciﬁc knowledge but overall international experience, we
measure international experience by the share of foreign sales in a ﬁrm’s total
sales.
Host Country Characteristics: The choice between full and shared own-
ership is also likely to be inﬂuenced by a variety of host country characteristics
(see Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001). Since the investigation of these issues is not of
immediate interest to this study, we control for host country speciﬁc factors with
dummy variables for destination countries.
4.3 Results
Next we turn to the regression results. Recall that in our probit model, the
dependent variable equals one if investor i has engaged in a JV with a local
partner in country k, and zero if the project is a direct entry. Thus, the number
of observations is equal to the number of projects undertaken in the region by all
ﬁrms in the sample. The estimated results are presented in Table 4 in terms of
marginal eﬀects.
The standard errors, listed in parentheses, are clustered for observations per-
taining for the same company. As predicted, the results indicate that ﬁrms pos-
sessing more sophisticated technologies relative to the industry average are less
14likely to engage in JVs and prefer to retain full ownership of their investment
projects (column 1). The same is true of ﬁrms with above average investment
in marketing and brand names (column 2). Both coeﬃcients are statistically
signiﬁcant and remain so even when both proxies are entered into the same equa-
tion (column 3). As a robustness check, in column 4 we include dummies for
three-digit SIC sectors and drop sector speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s .T h ec o e ﬃcient on tech-
nological sophistication bears the same sign and remains signiﬁcant while the
coeﬃcient on relative advertising intensity loses its signiﬁcance.
As for other explanatory variables, as anticipated, we ﬁnd that JVs are more
likely to take place in industries where intangible assets play a less prominent
role (i.e., industries characterized by lower spending on R&D and advertising).
Further, they are more likely to be undertaken by smaller and more diversiﬁed
ﬁrms. Regional and international experience do not appear to have a statistically
signiﬁcant impact on the decision regarding the mode of entry.
One could argue that our empirical analysis suﬀers from a selection bias since
we only consider projects that took place and ignore ﬁrms that decided against
investment in a particular country or in the whole region. Thus, as a further
robustness check, we estimate a two-stage model where the ﬁrst stage (Invest-
ment decision) describes the decision to invest and the second stage (Ownership
decision) examines the choice of mode of entry. The dependent variable in the
ﬁrst stage is equal to one if ﬁrm i has undertaken FDI in country k and zero
otherwise. In addition to all the determinants of the mode of entry described in
the previous section, the ﬁrst stage includes controls for host country character-
istics commonly found in studies of FDI determinants.11 These are: market size
(proxied by population size), purchasing power of local consumers (captured by
GDP per capita), quality of business environment (measured using the EBRD
ratings of progress in transition process), corporate tax rate, openness to trade
(deﬁned as the sum of exports and imports divided by the GDP) and distance
between source and host country.
11See Wheeler and Mody (1992) and a survey of the literature on the determinants of FDI
by Markusen (1995).
15The second stage includes all the variables used in the simple probit model
plus two controls pertaining to host countries: transition progress and distance
between the source and the host country. We expect to ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient
on the former variable, as the more advanced the host country in the reform
process, the less need for help from a local partner to navigate through the bu-
reaucracy in order to obtain the necessary permits and deal with tax authorities.
Similarly, the smaller the distance between the home and host country, the more
familiar are foreign investors with the ways of doing business in their investment
destination and thus again less need for a JV partner.
We estimate the two equations described above simultaneously by maximum
likelihood (probit with sample selection), correcting standard errors for correla-
tion between observations for the same ﬁrm. The number of observations in the
ﬁrst equation (Investment decision) is equal to the number of ﬁrms in the sample,
multiplied by the number of destination countries covered by the data set less
observations with missing values. In the ownership decision equation, the number
of observations is equal to the total number of FDI projects in the sample.
The results, presented in the ﬁrst three columns of Table 5, lend support to
our hypothesis. In Table 5, the top panel contains the ﬁndings from the second
stage (Ownership decision) and it conﬁrms that ﬁrms with more sophisticated
technologies and marketing techniques are averse to sharing ownership and prefer
to enter a host country directly. As before, the data indicate that joint ventures
are less common in high R&D and advertising-intensive industries and among
larger investors. Furthermore, there is some, albeit not very strong, indication
that more diversiﬁed ﬁrms as well as those with less international experience
tend to undertake joint ventures rather than enter directly. As expected, the
data suggests that joint ventures are a less attractive option in economies more
advanced in the transition process where doing business is likely to be easier.
Finally, regional experience and distance between the source and host country do
not appear to have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on the ownership choice.
The Investment equation, presented in the lower panel of Table 5, also pro-
duces the expected results. The ﬁndings indicate that larger ﬁrms and those
16operating in advertising-intensive industries are more likely to undertake FDI.
T h es a m ei st r u eo fﬁrms familiar with the region, possessing international expe-
rience and less diversiﬁed companies.12 In terms of host country characteristics,
economies that are larger and more advanced in the transition process are more
attractive investment destinations. Similarly, less distant countries and those
more open to trade and oﬀering lower corporate tax rates are more successful at
attracting FDI. On the other hand, GDP per capita, which may be a proxy for
labor costs, does not appear to have impact on the investment decision.
As noted in our data appendix, ﬁrms which engaged in FDI in the region are
over-sampled in our data set. Therefore, as an additional robustness check we
reestimate the two-stage model restricting our sample to investors, i.e., ﬁrms with
at least one investment in the countries considered in the study. An additional
beneﬁt of this restriction is that we reduce the number of zeros on the left hand
side of the equation, as the original data set contains many ﬁr m st h a th a v en o t
undertaken any investment projects in the region. These results, shown in the last
three columns of Table 5, do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those obtained from the
full sample. The variables of interest, technological and marketing sophistication,
retain their signs, magnitudes and signiﬁcance levels thus again lending support
to our hypothesis.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The choice of entry mode by foreign investors has been of interest to both policy
makers and researchers in the ﬁeld of international business. Developing country
governments are especially interested in the technology and know-how transfer
that results from FDI. To be able to assess the potential magnitude of such
beneﬁts, it is important to understand preferences of diﬀerent types of investors
with respect to the entry mode. This study sheds some light on this issue by
analyzing the intraindustry determinants of entry modes chosen by foreign ﬁrms
entering transition economies of Eastern Europe and the successor states of the
S o v i e tU n i o ni nt h ee a r l y1 9 9 0 s .
12More diversiﬁed ﬁrms may be under less pressure to search for new markets.
17Our empirical work is motivated by a simple theoretical model that allows
for competition between asymmetric foreign investors. The model predicts that
a relatively eﬃcient foreign investors are less likely to choose JVs and more likely
to enter directly. The empirical results supports this prediction. Thus, policies
inﬂuencing FDI entry mode may aﬀect technological content of the investment
projects and generate diﬀerent implications for the extent of potential spillovers
to the host economy.
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216A p p e n d i x I
Here, we report all of the analytical derivations and provide proofs for our results.




 (q)qi − ci = a − bq−i − 2bqi − ci =0










where i =1 ,2 and x,y = e,j.
Furthermore, the equilibrium proﬁto faﬁrm under regime (x,y) is equal to
























































1 > 0. (8)
Using the equilibrium quantity levels given in equation (6), we can describe the




θ(a − 2(α1 + δβ1)+α2 + β2) − (a − 2(α1 + β1)+α2 + β2)
=(1−
√
θ)(−a +2 α1 − α2 − β2)+2 β1(1 −
√
θδ)
We can similarly show that






2 > 0. (9)
and















As for the case of u1, we can describe the above incentive functions in terms of
exogenous parameters using equations (6), (1), and (2).















































6.2 Proof of corollary 1
From equations (8) and (9), we know that corollary 1 holds iﬀ
e2 − e1 > 0









i.e. e2 − e1 is decreasing in θ.F u r t h e r m o r e ,a tθ =1 ,w eh a v e
e2 − e1|θ=1 =
2(β2 − β1)(1 − δ)
3
> 0
T h u s ,i tm u s tb et h a te2−e1 > 0for all θ.S i n c ee2 is strictly bigger than e1,t h e r e
surely exist parameter values for which only ﬁr m2h a sau n i l a t e r a li n c e n t i v ef o r
aJ V .
To prove the second statement of the corollary, it is enough to show that if









i.e. d2 − e1 is decreasing in θ.F u r t h e r m o r e ,a tθ =1 ,w eh a v e
d2 − e1|θ=1 =
2(β2 − β1)(1 − δ)
3
> 0
Thus, it must be that d2 − e1 > 0for all θ. In other words, if ﬁrm 1 has a
unilateral incentive for a JV, ﬁrm 2 will have a competitive incentive for a JV.
As a result, the regime (j, e) cannot be an equilibrium.
237A p p e n d i x I I : D a t a
A. Survey
The respondents of the 1995 EBRD survey were asked to classify each of
their existing or planned projects as a JV with a local partner, acquisition, or
greenﬁeld entry. For the purpose of this study, we classify all greenﬁeld and
acquisition projects not associated with JVs as direct entry. In other words,
if a respondent listed more than one form of entry mode, the observation was
classiﬁed as a JV if one of these forms was “JV with a local partner,” and direct
entry otherwise.
As a robustness check, we also used an alternative classiﬁcation in which we
created a separate observation for each entry mode reported by a respondent.
Then we estimated a probit model with the dependent variable taking on the
value of unity for JVs and zero for greenﬁeld projects. The results on the vari-
ables of interest (i.e., R&D and marketing intensities) were very similar to those
presented in Table 4. Further, we also estimated a multinomial logit model with
the dependent variable representing the three entry modes and a multinomial
logit model with three entry modes plus the option of not investing at all. In
both cases, the results on the impact of intangible assets on the choice between
greenﬁeld projects and JVs lent support to our hypothesis.
It is likely that ﬁrms which perceived the survey as more relevant (for instance,
ﬁrms that had invested or considered investing in transition economies) were more
likely to respond. To check this hypothesis, the list of major foreign investors
in Poland compiled by the Polish State Investment Agency (PAIZ, 1995) was
examined. Poland was chosen for this exercise since it was the most popular
destination country in the sample. Out of 329 ﬁrms on the list 118 received the
EBRD survey and ﬁfty percent of them responded, as opposed to the overall
response rate for the survey equal to about ﬁfteen percent. Statistical tests
indicated that the means of ﬁrm speciﬁc variables in the respondent and non-
respondent groups were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other. Thus among
the investing ﬁrms, the decision to respond to the survey was not systematically
related to ﬁrm characteristics. Unfortunately, it was not possible to identify
which among the ﬁrms that did not respond to the survey were not interested in
undertaking investment in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. There
is no reason, however, to suspect that in the case of these ﬁrms, the decision to
answer the survey was systematically related to their characteristics. Therefore,
24the data set can be treated as if the investing ﬁrms had been oversampled. This
did not, however, aﬀect our results from the probit speciﬁcation outlined above as
it is estimated using information on actual investment projects and thus pertains
to investing ﬁrms only.
The survey did not ask about the date when each investment was undertaken.
Since the magnitude of FDI inﬂows to transition countries was marginal before
1989 and the survey was conducted in January 1995, the information collected
pertains mostly to the period 1989-94. Further, to the best of our knowledge, none
of the countries in the sample had legislation speciﬁcally forbidding full ownership
by foreign investors. For instance, in the USSR a presidential decree issued as
early as October 1990 allowed foreign wholly owned companies to be established
in the form of branches or subsidiaries. The decree also created the legal basis for
foreign investors to buy out existing Soviet enterprises as these were privatized
(McMillan 1996, p. 50). In Hungary, Act XXIV of 1988 on the Investment
of Foreigners in Hungary allowed non-Hungarian companies to own equity up
to 100 per cent (WTO, 1998). In Poland, the 1988 Law on Economic Activity
with the Participation of Foreign Parties permitted 100 per cent foreign equity
participation (GATT, 1992). It is possible, however, that in practice permissions
for fully owned projects may had been denied in some economies during the
period covered by our sample. To control for this possibility, we included host
country dummies in our model.
Since restrictions on the extent of foreign ownership may have been present in
extractive sector and services, we excluded ﬁrms in the coal, gas and oil industry
from our sample. We also dropped projects in service industries, such as, banking,
insurance, telecommunications, accounting and public relations services, etc. In
addition to possible restrictions on FDI, including these sectors would also pose
some diﬃculties with measuring the endowment of intangible assets.
Note that our analysis assumes that all foreign investors have the option of
engaging in a JV with a local partner, should they want to do so. In other
words, the supply of local JV partners is not constrained and the observed entry
patterns are determined entirely by foreign investors’ demand. Considering that
the aggregate FDI inﬂows into transition economies were quite small during the
period covered by our sample, this assumption is quite realistic.
B. Other Data Sources
All ﬁrm-speciﬁc explanatory variables used in the analysis, with the exception
25of regional experience which comes from the survey, were taken from the com-
mercial database Worldscope and are for 1993 (or the closest year for which the
information is available). Note that the variables pertain to the characteristics
of the parent companies, not their particular subsidiaries in the regions. Details
of variable deﬁnitions are listed below.
Firm Size: log of ﬁrm sales in millions of US dollars.
Relative Technological Sophistication: Firm R&D intensity/Average
R&D intensity in the industry.
R&D intensity is measured by R&D expenditure expressed as a percentage
of total sales. To calculate industry averages (at the three digit SIC industry
classiﬁc a t i o n )w eu s eﬁgures for all ﬁrms listed in Worldscope in a given industry,
not just ﬁrms included in our sample. Thus, these values correspond to the
average R&D intensity of major ﬁrms operating in developed countries in a given
industry.
Relative Marketing Sophistication: Firm advertising intensity/Average
advertising intensity in the industry.
Advertising intensity is deﬁned as the ratio of Sales, General, and Administra-
tive expenditure to total sales, which is a standard proxy used in the literature.
The industry average is again calculated at the three-digit SIC level.
Product Diversiﬁcation: the number of four digit SIC codes describing a
ﬁrm’s activities.
International Experience: the share of foreign sales in a ﬁrm’s total sales.
Ideally, we would like to use the share of foreign assets in a ﬁrm’s total assets.
However, using this measure would severely reduce the size of our sample. The
share of foreign sales is highly correlated with the share of foreign assets (corre-
lation of .82). Thus, our proxy for international experience seems reasonable.
Population Size, GDP per capita: both variables enter in log form, per-
tain to 1993 and come from EBRD (various issues).
Transition Indicators: T h et r a n s i t i o ni n d i c a t o r sr a t et h ep r o g r e s so fa
country’s reforms in the following areas: price liberalization and competition,
trade and exchange system, large-scale privatization, small-scale privatization,
enterprise restructuring, and banking reform. See EBRD (1994, p. 11) for a
26detailed description. In the empirical analysis, a simple average of the EBRD
indicators is used.
Openness to trade: log (Exports + Imports)/GDP is calculated using ﬁg-
ures from the World Bank World Development Indicators.
Corporate tax rate: expressed in percentages, corresponds to the highest
rate applicable in the host country. Source: PriceWaterhouseCoopers.
Distance: log distance between the capital cities expressed in kilometers.
The following source countries are included in the sample: United Kingdom,
United States, Germany, France, Finland, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Nether-
lands, Austria, Sweden, Belgium, Canada, Japan, Australia, Italy, Greece, Ire-
land, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Brazil, Malaysia, South Africa and South Ko-
rea.
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TABLE 1.  Entry modes chosen by investors in the sample 
 
Host country       Direct entry  JV  Total 
Russia 29  72  101 
Poland 45  60  105 
Czech Rep.  47  43  90 
Hungary 41  37  78 
Slovak Rep.  16  22  38 
Ukraine 5  17  22 
Estonia 8  16  24 
Romania 10  14  24 
Bulgaria 11  10  21 
Latvia 6  10  16 
Slovenia 3  10  13 
Kazakhstan 6  8  14 
Lithuania 5  6  11 
Croatia 4  6  10 
Belarus 3  4  7 
Georgia 2  4  6 
Uzbekistan 1  4  5 
Albania 1  3  4 
Macedonia FYR  1  2  3 
Azerbaijan 1  1  2 
Moldova 0  1  1 








as % of all projects in the 
industry 
JVs 
as % of all 
projects in the 
industry 
Total no. of 
projects in 
the industry 
Recreational products  100.0  0.0  5 
Drugs, cosmetics & health care products  87.9 12.1  58 
Beverages 84.2  15.8  19 
Electrical 67.7  32.3  31 
Apparel 50.0  50.0  2 
Printing & publishing  50.0  50.0  4 
Metal products   42.1  57.9  19 
Food 40.4  59.6  57 
Automotive 40.0  60.0  25 
Textiles 40.0  60.0  5 
Metal   33.3  66.7  27 
Machinery & equipment  32.2  67.8  90 
Electronics 32.1  67.9  78 
Aerospace 22.2  77.8  9 
Chemicals 22.0  78.0  59 
Paper 19.0  81.0  21 
Diversified 4.8  95.2  21 
Tobacco 0.0  100.0  5 





TABLE 3. R&D intensity of FDI projects in 3 digit SIC industries 
 
High technology 
sectors  SIC code  JVs  Direct entry  All 
Drugs 283  10.62  15.71  15.23 
Measuring and controlling devices  382 9.94  9.08  9.61 
Aircraft and parts  372  7.48  9.44  8.08 
Communications equipment  366  5.60  13.31  7.06 
Medical instruments and supplies  384  4.58  5.07  4.99 
Electronic components and 
accessories 
367 3.39  5.63  4.14 
Computer and office equipment  357  4.09    4.09 
Search and navigation equipment  381  3.20    3.20 





sectors  SIC code  JVs  Direct entry  All 
Refrigeration and service 
machinery 
358   7.26  7.26 
Electric distributi equipment  361  7.26    7.26 
Hose, belting, gasket and packing  305 6.00  6.00  6.00 
Plastics materials and synthetics  282  4.65  4.86  4.71 
Special industry machinery  355  4.22  5.68  4.70 
Industrial inorganic chemicals  281  4.09  6.23  4.46 
Motor vehicles and equipment  371  3.91  4.49  4.17 
Railroad equipment  374  1.49  4.60  3.05 
Household audio and video 
equipment 
365 5.79  1.03  2.93 
Metalworking machinery  354  2.68  2.56  2.66 
Soap, cleaners and toilet goods  284  2.60    2.60 
General industrial machinery  356  2.30    2.30 
Ship and boat building and repair  373  2.14    2.14 
Engines and turbines  351  2.11  2.11  2.11 
Construction and related 
machinery 
353 1.83  2.49  2.03 
Industrial machinery, nec  359    1.75  1.75 
Misc. manufactures  399  1.59  1.59  1.59 
Misc. chemical products  289  1.31    1.31 
Misc. plastic products, nec  308  1.22  0.11  1.11 
Farm and garden machinery  352  0.00  3.68  0.74 
Electric lightning, wiring 
equipment 
364 0.67    0.67 
Rubber and plastics footwear  302  0.00  0.00  0.00 







sectors  SIC code  JVs  Direct entry  All 
Printing trade services  279    5.25  5.25 
Preserved fruits and vegetables  203  4.24    4.24 
Broadwoven fabric mills,  wool 223  4.00  4.00 
Nonferrous rolling and drawing  335  1.54  5.11  3.16 
Heavy construction, exc. highway  162   2.70  2.70 
Electrical  work  173  2.67  2.67 
Copper ores  102  1.75  2.84  2.29 
Cutlery, handtools and hardware  342  2.22  2.28  2.27 
Nonresident building construction  154 1.25  2.94  1.93 
Misc. food and kindred products  209    1.86  1.86 
Sugar and confectionery products  206    1.83  1.83 
Misc. metal ores  109  1.73    1.73 
Manifold business forms  276  1.43    1.43 
Misc. textile goods  229  1.40    1.40 
Clay, ceramic and refractory 
minerals 
145  1.35  1.35 
Secondary nonferrous metals  334    1.34  1.34 
Primary nonferrous metals 333  1.23  1.23  1.23 
Iron ores  101    1.21  1.21 
Misc. converted paper products  267  0.21  1.34  1.15 
Misc. nonmetallic mineral 
products 
329 0.76  2.43  1.13 
Metal cans and shipping 
containers 
341 1.20  0.79  0.99 
Blast furnace and basic steel 
products 
331  0.93  0.93 
Meat products  201  0.79  0.91  0.85 
Grain mill products  204  0.68  1.10  0.72 
Glass and glassware pressed or 
blown 
322   0.65  0.65 
Misc. wood products  249  0.63  0.63  0.63 
Paper mills  262  0.60  0.67  0.61 
Dairy  products  202  0.57  0.57 
Highway and street construction  161  0.55    0.55 
Fabricated structural metal 
products 
344 0.00  0.82  0.55 
Paperboard containers and boxes  265  0.44  0.33  0.40 
Carpets and rugs  227    0.36  0.36 
Cement,  hydraulic  324  0.28  0.28 
Fats and oils  207  0.15  0.15  0.15 
Beverages 208  0.35  0.13  0.15 
Gold and silver ores  104  0.00    0.00 
Commercial printing  275    0.00  0.00 




TABLE 4. Results of a probit model - JV vs. direct entry 
 
   
Relative R&D  -0.055* -0.069*  -0.187*
(0.033) (0.041)  (0.100)
Industry R&D  -0.039*** -0.058*** 
(0.012) (0.019) 
Relative Advertising  -0.166** -0.244**  -0.317
(0.085) (0.120)  (0.232)
Industry Advertising  -0.007** <.001 
(0.003) (0.004) 
Diversification  0.037* 0.022 0.043**  -0.057
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022)  (0.043)
Reg. Experience  0.096 0.098 0.141  0.192
(0.101) (0.102) (0.107)  (0.155)
Int'l Experience  -0.002 -0.002 -0.001  -0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003)
Firm Size  -0.051* -0.062** -0.086**  -0.063
(0.031) (0.028) (0.035)  (0.059)
 
Host dummies  yes yes yes  yes
Industry dummies  no no no  yes
   
obs. P.  0.60 0.56 0.57  0.51
pred. P.  0.61 0.57 0.57  0.52
   
No of obs.  439 424 345  243
Pseudo R
2  0.14 0.13 0.21  0.41
Log Likelihood  -255.07 -254.04 -185.61  -98.75
   
Dependent variable is equal to one for JVs and zero for direct entry.  The results are 
presented in terms of marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean.  All models include a 
constant term which is not reported.  Standard errors (clustered on firm) are listed in 
parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% 





 TABLE 5. Results of a two-stage model 
     
      All firms           Investors only   
Ownership  Decision               
Relative R&D  -0.160** -0.176*  -0.157**  -0.173*
(0.079) (0.103)  (0.079)  (0.103)
Industry R&D  -0.102*** -0.129***  -0.103***  -0.130***
(0.032) (0.047)  (0.032)  (0.047)
Relative ADV  -0.357* -0.565*    -0.357* -0.549*
(0.219) (0.307)    (0.219) (0.307)
Industry ADV  -0.017** -0.003    -0.017** -0.002
(0.007) (0.009)    (0.007) (0.009)
Diversification 0.075 0.050 0.102*  0.075  0.051 0.104*
  (0.052) (0.058) (0.054)  (0.052)  (0.058) (0.054)
Reg. Experience  0.223 0.243 0.296  0.265  0.257 0.356
  (0.257) (0.268) (0.284)  (0.251)  (0.261) (0.277)
Int'l Experience  -0.008** -0.007 -0.004  -0.008*  -0.007 -0.004
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.005) (0.006)
log (Firm Size)  -0.145* -0.154** -0.230***  -0.132*  -0.150** -0.219**
  (0.079) (0.076) (0.088)  (0.078)  (0.074) (0.087)
log (Distance)  -0.145 -0.063 -0.031  -0.176*  -0.073 -0.064
  (0.107) (0.103) (0.116)  (0.106)  (0.099) (0.113)
Transition index  -0.490*** -0.404*** -0.421***  -0.495***  -0.402*** -0.428***
  (0.143) (0.135) (0.149)  (0.148)  (0.137) (0.153)
 
 





Investment Decision  All firms      Investors only 
Relative R&D  -0.003 -0.008 -0.043 -0.043 
(0.031) (0.040) (0.031) (0.043) 
Industry R&D  0.026 -0.010 0.039* -0.006 
(0.020) (0.024) (0.023) (0.031) 
Relative ADV  0.065 0.212* 0.100 0.128 
(0.077) (0.126) (0.090) (0.119) 
Industry ADV  0.014*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Diversification  -0.059* -0.041 -0.056 -0.079*** -0.072*** -0.089*** 
  (0.033) (0.027) (0.037) (0.028) (0.026) (0.033) 
Reg. Experience  0.265** 0.324*** 0.403*** 0.016 0.064 0.107 
  (0.127) (0.119) (0.157) (0.135) (0.122) (0.174) 
Int'l Experience  0.003 0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
log (Firm Size)  0.207*** 0.194*** 0.202*** 0.163*** 0.174*** 0.171*** 
  (0.031) (0.029) (0.033) (0.036) (0.030) (0.037) 
log (Distance)  -0.427*** -0.383*** -0.407*** -0.318*** -0.263*** -0.284*** 
  (0.068) (0.066) (0.076) (0.060) (0.056) (0.067) 
Transition index  0.518*** 0.514*** 0.603*** 0.777*** 0.771*** 0.910*** 
  (0.108) (0.106) (0.119) (0.122) (0.120) (0.136) 
log (Population)  0.512*** 0.479*** 0.538*** 0.691*** 0.648*** 0.754*** 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.039) (0.051) (0.050) (0.059) 
log (GDP per capita)  0.078 0.076 0.017 0.049 0.044 -0.039 
  (0.066) (0.068) (0.073) (0.078) (0.080) (0.089) 
Corporate tax rate  -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.026*** -0.031*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
log (Openness to trade)  0.411*** 0.219** 0.430*** 0.630*** 0.384*** 0.702*** 
  (0.100) (0.104) (0.113) (0.140) (0.146) (0.159) 
   
rho -0.200*** -0.062*** -0.218*** -0.155*** -0.039*** -0.171*** 
 (0.165) (0.185) (0.189) (0.146) (0.158) (0.165) 
   
No. of obs.  7,707 8,589 6,258 2,982 3,171 2,352 
  Censored  7,267 8,164 5,912 2,542 2,746 2,006 
  Uncensored  440 425 346 440 425 346 
   
Wald Stat  37.0 25.5 42.8 35.5 24.6 41.4 
Prob Wald > 0  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Log likelihood  -1,445.6 -1,446.4 -1,117.9   -1,138.4 -1,139.2 -863.9 
In the Investment decision equation, the dependent variable is equal to one if firm i has undertaken investment 
in country k and zero otherwise.  In the Ownership decision equation, the dependent variable takes on the 
value of one for JVs and zero for direct entry.  All models include a constant term which is not reported.  
Standard errors (clustered on firm) are listed in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% 
level, * significant at 10% level. 
 